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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Lyle C. Hendricks, PETITIONER'S APPELLANT 
Petitioner/Appellant : BRIEF 
-vs- : 
State of Utah, : Case No. 930055-CA 
Respondent/Appellee : 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Petition for Extraordinary Relief is not a successive or delayed petition, nor is it 
repetitious, when through Petitioner's own diligence new evidence is obtained 
showing perjured testimony regarding the formulation of "intent" which subsequently 
resulted in a conviction for an offense which was not committed. Ineffective 
assistance of counsel. 
REPORT OF DECISION 
The [r]uling on writ of extraordinary relief by Judge Michael Glasmann of the 
Second Judicial District Court of January 12th, 1993. Docketing Statement of 
February 16th, 1993, and Utah Court of Appeals Order Case 930055-CA by Judge 
Regnal W. Garff, Judge dated March 23rd, 1993 is attached. 
STATEMENT OF GROUNDS FOR JURISDICTION 
The decision previously referred to was filed on January 12th, 1993. No 
orders granting extension have been granted. The Utah Court of Appeals has 
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jurisdiction pursuant to Title 78, Chapter 2a, Section 3 (2) (g) of the Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, as amended, and Rule 65 B (b) (13) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
See Addendum 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. This is an appeal from a ruling in the Second Judicial District Court Pursuant to 
the dismissal of a Petition for Extraordinary Relief which was filed under Rule 65B of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure based on newly discovered evidence regarding the 
veracity of one of the state's key witnesses. 
2. The witnesses testimony was relied upon for the formulation of "intent" in the 
crime of aggravated robbery. 
3. Appellant now has proof the this witnesses testimony was false. 
4. Dismissal of the original petition by Judge Glasmann was on the grounds of 
being repetitious; frivolous. 
5. Notice of Appeal was filed with the Utah Court of Appeals on January 29th, 
1993. 
6. Appellee's Motion to Dismiss before this court was denied on March 23, 1993, 
by Judge Garff. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
In the afternoon of December 8, 1987, an individual later identified as the 
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Appellant, Lyle C. Hendricks, entered Murray's Pharmacy and walked to the back of 
the store where the pharmacy's owner, Mr. Murray and an employee, Mrs. 
Blackwell, were working. He had a gun in his hand and asked the owner, Mr. 
Murray, for all of his class II narcotics. Mr. Murray replied that he did not have any 
class II narcotics and when questioned opened a drawer to show Mr. Hendricks that it 
was empty. At that point, Mr. Hendricks turned around and walked out stating that he 
was "only joking anyway". Mr. Murray immediately telephoned the police as Mrs. 
Blackwell went to the front door. Mrs. Blackwell identified the Appellant's car leaving 
the parking lot of the pharmacy. Mr. Murray forwarded the information to the Ogden 
City Police Department which led to Appellant's later apprehension and the recovery 
of an unloaded nine millimeter handgun. The vehicle was seen by Ogden City police 
officers and after a chase, the vehicle stopped near 24th Street and Jefferson. Mrs. 
Blackwell was taken to the area where she identified the vehicle as the one leaving 
Murray's Pharmacy. 
Mr. Hendricks was arrested as a suspect in the robbery and both witnesses 
were brought to the jail to be present at a line-up. both Mr. Murray and Mrs. Blackwell 
picked the Appellant out of the line-up as the individual who entered Murray's 
Pharmacy with a gun. While waiting for the line-up to occur, Mr. Hendricks kept 
indicating his innocence to Officer Zimmermann until finally Officer Zimmermann 
advised him of his Miranda rights. After being advised, Mr. Hendricks indicated he 
wanted to talk. During the course of the interrogation, the Appellant indicated a 
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series of facts regarding himself and his vehicle, but finally admitted he had gone into 
Murray's pharmacy, but not to commit an armed robbery Mr Hendricks claimed he 
entered the pharmacy at about 2 30 or 2 45 to get some cold medicine At that point, 
Officer Zimmermann indicated that the Appellant wouldn't answer any more of his 
questions 
After the initial questioning was terminated the Appellant (Mr Hendricks) did 
not talk to any of the officers until the next morning when an Officer Minor happened to 
be present in the jail during a video arraignment process Mr Hendricks had 
apparently been unable to come to terms with his private counsel, Paul Stockdale, 
and was requesting the assistance of a public defender At this time, a M r G Scott 
Jensen was appearing for the Public Defenders Association to handle video 
arraignments on the morning law and motion calendar Throughout the arraignment 
process Mr Jensen was present with the Appellant and Detective Minor Detective 
Minor did not renew the Miranda warnings with Mr Hendricks, and even so, 
proceeded to ask Mr Hendricks questions regarding the robbery charge During that 
discussion no statements adverse to the Appellant's position were given 
Subsequently Detective Minor formulated a report and testified at Appellant's trial 
that during this period Mr Hendricks "confessed" to him the required intentional 
elements of the crime of aggravated robbery Detective Minor stated that Mr G Scott 
Jensen was present during this confession 
At trial, during the testimony of Detective Minor the Appellant, Mr Hendricks 
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objected. A conference was held in judges chambers and the Appellants trial 
counsel, Stephen Laker, was told to contact Mr. Jensen, At this point the court 
recognized if Detective Minor's testimony about the confession were untrue the jury 
would be tainted and a mistrial would be in order. Appellant's trial counsel, Stephen 
Laker did not attempt to contact Mr. Jensen as the court instructed. As a result of this 
indifference perjured testimony entered into the record and this testimony played a 
major part in the juries verdict. It is only now, several years later, through Mr. 
Hendricks own diligence that he has obtained a affidavit from Mr. Jensen. This 
affidavit proves Appellant's contention that there never was a "confession" to 
Detective Minor. 
ARGUMENT 
Point 1 
PETITION FOR EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF IN THIS CASE IS NOT A 
SUCCESSIVE OR REPETITIOUS PETITION WHEN PETITIONER'S DILIGENCE 
PROVIDES NEW EVIDENCE IN ADDITION TO DEMONSTRATION A COLORABLE 
SHOWING OF FACTUAL INNOCENCE. 
In Sanders v. United States. 373 U.S. 1 (1963) the Supreme Court stated that 
successive petitions can be denied if three conditions are evident: first, the same 
ground presented in the subsequent petition was decided adversely to the petitioner 
on the prior petition; second, the prior determination was on the merits; and third, 
"ends of justice" would not be served by reconsideration of the claim. 
While it is true that the Appellant has filed a previous petition and his post-
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conviction appeal, his claim has never been bourne out to the current level as he 
now has hard evidence showing that a highly prejudicial interrogation never took 
place between himself and a Detective Minor. In previously raising a ineffectiveness 
of counsel claim, Appellant has stated that he did object through his trial counsel, 
one Stephen Laker, about the false nature of Detective Minor's testimony. Then, the 
trial court immediately called for a conference in chambers where both counsels were 
instructed as to the fact that if the Detective's testimony were in fact false, a mistrial 
would result. Defense counsel was then instructed to contact the attorney present at 
the video arraignment, one G. Scott Jensen, for verification. This never occurred. 
Appellant contends that the "ends of justice" require an intense 
reconsideration of this claim. Even if "abuse of the writ" is found, however, the court 
may not dismiss the petition if the "ends of justice" require consideration of the claim. 
Sanders, 373 U.S. at 18-19. A claim of constitutional magnitude is involved. In White 
v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760, 89 LEd 1348, 65 SCt 978 (1953) the United States Supreme 
Court held that a conviction secured by the use of perjured testimony known to be 
such by the prosecuting attorney is lacking due process. In addition, the case of 
Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents. 403 U.S. 388, 29 LEd 2d 619, 91 SCt 1999 (1971), 
the Court held that government agents who act in an unconstitutional manner become 
liable for monetary damages. 
Notwithstanding liability here, for it appears that the real damage has been 
done to Mr. Hendricks. The Appellant, Lyle Hendricks, has brought a showing of 
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good cause that justifies the filing of a successive habeas corpus claim as stated by 
the Utah court in Hurst v. Cook, 777 P.2d 1029 (Utah 1989) where the Court 
stipulated that such a showing of good cause may be established by showing: (1) the 
denial of a constitutional right pursuant to a new law that is, or might be, retroactive; 
(2) new facts not previously known that would show the denial of a constitutional right 
or might change the outcome of the trial; (3) the existence of fundamental unfairness 
in a conviction; (4) the illegality of a sentence; or (5) a claim overlooked in good faith 
with no intent to delay or abuse the writ. 
Clearly, the affidavits of G. Scott Jensen constitute the requisite new facts 
consisting of a denial of due process claim, Mr. Jensen was present at the video 
arraignment, and in stating that the interrogation by Detective Minor never took 
place, the State now lacks the intent necessary to prove the crime of aggravated 
robbery. A condition that would have most definitely changed the outcome of the trial. 
The existence of such a fundamental unfairness goes to the heart of the 
purpose of the writ. Habeas Corpus is not to be used to review a final judgment 
arrived at through regular proceedings and due process of law by a court having 
jurisdiction, but it is to be used to protect anyone who is restrained of his liberty 
where there exists no jurisdiction or authority, or where the requirements of the law 
have been so ignored or distorted that the party is substantially and effectively denied 
what is included in the term due process of law, or where some other circumstance 
exists which would make it wholly unconscionable not to re-examine the conviction. 
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Brvant v. Turner, 19 Utah 2d 284, 431 P.2d 121 (1967) ; Gallegos v. Turner. 17 Utah 
2d 273, 490 P.2d 386 (1965). See also Rammell v. Smith, 560 P.2d 1108 (Utah 
1977). 
In Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436 (1986) (plurality opinion) a plurality of the 
United States Supreme Court agreed that the "ends of justice" require that a petitioner 
filing a successive petition supplement his constitutional claim with a colorable 
showing of factual innocence. Although acceptance of the Kuhlmann plurality 
standard has varied among the circuits that have addressed the issue, Appellant 
contends that with only Detective Minor's testimony, and the prosecutions mention of 
it in closing statements, forming the only basis for the necessary "intent" to commit 
aggravated robbery, now, without this testimony as it is untrue and the requisite 
suppression of its mention in closing, the Appellant Mr. Hendricks is shown, inter 
alia, to be factually innocent of the crime of aggravated robbery. 
And, despite the preference for finality in litigation, re judicata does not apply 
to habeas proceedings. Sanders, 373 U.S. at 7. The rationale for not applying res 
judicata goes again to the heart of the writ: habeas proceedings are designed to hold 
the government accountable to the judiciary for a person's imprisonment. Therefore, 
"access to the courts on habeas must not be thus impeded". Id. at 8. See also 
Daniels v. Blackburn. 763 F.2d 705 (5th Cir. 1985) (Res judicata principles do not 
apply in habeas corpus proceedings). 
POINT II 
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APPELLANT WAS DENIED HIS RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 
COUNSEL 
The sixth amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I Section 12 
of the Utah State Constitution guarantees the right to effective assistance of counsel in 
criminal prosecutions. In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) the Supreme 
Court established a two-prong standard to govern ineffective assistance claims. To 
obtain reversal of a conviction the defendant must prove (1) that counsel's 
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) that there is 
a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different. 
The Utah Supreme Court has adopted this approach and stated the following in 
State v. Geary 707 P.2d 645, 646 (Utah 1985): 
In challenging a conviction on the ground of ineffective 
assistance of counsel, it is the defendant's burden to 
show: (1) that his counsel rendered a deficient performance 
in some demonstrable manner, and (2) that the outcome 
of the trial would probably have been different but for 
counsel's error. Codiannav. Morris 660 P.2d 1101 (Utah 1983) 
Failure to meet either of these requirements will defeat a claim based on 
ineffectiveness of counsel. Additionally the claims must be "sufficient to overcome 
the strong presumption that counsel rendered adequate assistance and exercised 
reasonable professional judgment". State v. Frame 723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986). 
To satisfy the requisite "prongs" of the Strickland and overcome the strong 
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presumption of Frame, the court may conclude that a single error rendered counsel's 
assistance ineffective, but it must consider the totality of the circumstances in making 
its determination. Strickland 466 U.S. at 690. It is exactly such a "totality of 
circumstances" that the Appellant prays this Court consider. For it is all too easy for a 
court, examining counsel's defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude 
that a particular act or omission of counsel was reasonable, thereby voiding a claim 
of ineffectiveness. 
Initially, the Appellant developed a somewhat strained relationship with his 
trial counsel, Mr. Stephen Laker, which hampered communication between the two. 
In the course of the trial proceedings, Mr. Laker met with the Appellant one time. 
Surely facing a serious first-degree felony charge requires more due diligence when 
a conviction could result in a sentence that would expire with the Appellant's own 
natural life. 
Specifically, the Appellant points to his attorney's failure to make any attempt to 
suppress the supposed statement Appellant made to Detective Minor. Supposed 
statement Appellant now has proof never occurred. (Affidavit of G. Scott Jensen no. 5 
and no. 6). The likelihood of the Appellant prevailing on the suppression of these 
inculpatory statements and confession is evidenced by the discussion in chambers 
on-the-record, between Judge Roth and Mr. Laker; 
The Court: "you were aware that testimony would be at least attempted to be 
introduced today at trial?" 
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Mr. Laker: "yes" 
The Court:". . . it would have been logical to have a suppression hearing prior 
to trial . . ." 
The Court:". . . if I do that now, we have a mistrial". 
(Transcript Pages 115, line 11 through line 15) 
Despite counsel's forewarning from the trial court, and despite counsel's client 
urging him to investigate and make claim, counsel failed to investigate or make the 
claim. 
In addition, Appellant points to his counsel's failure to cross-examine many of 
the State's witnesses (Transcript, page 44, page 58, page 87, page 90). Counsel's 
failure to make an opening statement to the jury (Transcript, page13). Counsel's 
failure to call witnesses on behalf of the defense and in presenting no defense 
whatsoever (Transcript, page 129). 
During the course of the trial an argument ensued between counsel and his 
client, over Mr. Hendricks requesting that he be called to testify on his own behalf. In 
the course of this verbal exchange, counsel voir dired his own client, on the record, 
that if he took the stand on his own behalf that the State would introduce evidence of a 
prior conviction (Transcript, page 124). It should be noted that this issue was never 
addressed by the trial court. 
It is also possible that counsel committed perjury before the trial court in 
response to the Court's Order that counsel interview Attorney G. Scott Jensen and 
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produce him before the Court (Transcript, page 122 and Affidavit of Q. Scott Jensen). 
Appellant contends the outcome of his trial would have been different. To 
prevail, the Appellant must: 
show that but for the alleged deficiencies of counsel 
there exists any reasonable probability that the jury's 
verdict would have been different, He [must show] 
that the adversarial process of the trial was so undermined 
that the jury could not have produced a just result. 
Frame at 405. 
Section 76-2-307 of the Utah Code Ann. (1991) "Voluntary termination of efforts 
prior to offense" states as follows: 
It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution in which an actor's 
criminal responsibility arises from his own conduct or from being 
party to the commission of the offense, the actor voluntarily 
terminated his effort to promote or facilitate its commission and either: 
(1) Gave timely warning to the proper law enforcement 
authorities or the intended victim; or 
(2) Wholly deprives his prior efforts of effectiveness in the 
commission. 
Appellant states and the record clearly shows that he took no Class II narcotics 
when he left Murray's Pharmacy on December 8, 1987 (Transcript, page 37, line 8) 
through line 15) while there were large amounts of other scheduled controlled 
substances and cash present, the Appellant, armed with an unloaded non-functional 
weapon, simply stated, "I was only kidding anyway" and left the store (Transcript, 
page 33, line 15 and page 37, line 14). 
1 The Section 76-2-307 U.C. Ann. (Utah Code Annotated) Affirmative defense 
of voluntary termination arises here not as a point of appeal, but only as a 
demonstration of a defense strategy left unused by counsel. It is utilized here for a 
showing satisfaction of both prongs of Stickland in that Appellant's actions constituted 
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its definition yet defense counsel failed to recognize, raise, or employ it. 
These facts show an uncanny parroting of Section 76-2-307 (2) of the Utah 
Code Ann. wherein the Appellant, "[WJholly deprives his prior efforts of effectiveness 
in the commission", of an aggravated robbery. Appellant contends that defense 
counsel's failure to recognize such an elemental affirmative defense, let alone raise 
or utilize it, constitutes both a showing of prejudice and a deficiency in performance 
as required by Strickland and Frame. 
The Appellant, Mr. Hendricks, situation meets the criteria in totality of 
circumstances that the Court's find most frequently results in reversal. Mr. Hendricks 
was completely deprived of any defense or allowed to testify on his own behalf, 
because of an untold conclusion[s] by defense counsel. See State v. Dumaine. 783 
P2d 1184, 1191 (Arizona 1989); and Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95, 34 Led 2d 330, 
93 SCt 351 (1972). 
Finally, accord defense counsel Mr. Laker's failure to file a timely Docketing 
Statement in the correct court or to perfect appeal. Dunn v. Cook. 791 P.2d 873 (Utah 
1990); Fernandez v. Cook. 783 P.2d 547 (Utah 1989) as cited in Jensen v. Deland. 
795 P.2d 619 (Utah 1989). 
POINT III 
WITH NEW EVIDENCE AND RECOGNITION OF APPELLANTS VOLUNTARY 
TERMINATION OF CRIMINAL EFFORTS, FACTS DO NOT SUPPORT A FINDING 
OF GUILT ON THE CHARGE OF AGGRAVATED ROBBERY. 
The Utah Code Annotated, Section 76-6-302, requires the State to prove 
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beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant, in the course of committing the robbery, 
(a) used a firearm or a facsimile of a firearm, knife or a facsimile of a knife, or a deadly 
weapon; (b) cause serious bodily injury upon another. Part (III) of Section 76-6-302 
provides that "For the purposes of this part an act shall be deemed to be: 
In the course of committing a robbery if it occurs 
in an attempt to commit, during the commission of, or 
in the immediate flight after the attempt or commission 
of a robbery. In order to satisfy its burden it is 
incumbent upon the State to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt the Defendant unlawfully and intentionally at least 
attempted to take personal property in the possession of 
another from his person, or from his immediate presence 
against his will accomplished by means of force or fear 
and that in doing so he used a firearm". 
The Utah Supreme Court has expressed a rather strict standard of review when 
the Court is asked to review the evidence to determine the sufficiency of the evidence 
to support a conviction. State v. Booker. 709 P.2d 342 (Utah 1985), where the Court 
stated: 
[W]e review the evidence and all inferences which may 
be reasonably drawn from it in a light most favorable 
to the verdict of the jury. We reverse a jury conviction 
for insufficient evidence only when the evidence so 
viewed is so sufficiently inclusive or inherently 
improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt that Defendant committed the crime of 
which he was convicted. 
State v. Fetree, Utah, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (1983); accord State v. McCardellf Utah, 
652P.2d942, 945 (1982V, State v. Martinez. Utah, 709 P.2d 355 (1985). 
The Appellant contends that even with this standard of review the facts 
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demonstrated in the present case are now clearly controverted. Appellant argues that 
with newly discovered evidence (Affidavit of G. Scott Jensen) showing that the 
statements to Detective Minor, in fact, never occurred, the State cannot show the 
requisite "intent" necessary for a showing that the crime he committed was an 
aggravated robbery. 
From the Affidavit of G. Scott Jensen; 
"5. At no time was I or Mr. Hendricks in an interview 
room with Detective Minor on the morning of December 
9th, 1987, where I left on any occasion, where Mr. 
Hendricks was with Detective Minor alone. 
6. Mr, Hendricks did stop Detective Minor in the hall-
way by the video arraignment room and asked whey he was 
being charged with a 1st degree felony, where Detective 
Minor stated, "cause a gun was involved" whereupon 
Mr. Hendricks went into the video arraignment and waived 
preliminary hearing and asked to be sentenced. 
7. I do remember a phone call from Stephen Laker on 
January 20th, 1988 asking about Mr. hendricks, but at 
the time I could not recollect who Mr. hendricks was, 
I was not asked about the facts concerning me or Mr. 
Hendricks being in the interview room with Detective Minor 
or I would have testified to the fats which would have 
been inconsistent with Detective Minor's testimony 
concerning Mr. Hendricks alleged confession". 
Appellant points to the State's own witnesses who admitted that when the 
Appellant asked for any Schedule II drugs, he was told that the object of his desire 
did not exist in the premises. The witnesses all clearly relate that the Appellant 
immediately turned around and walked out of the store the same way that he had 
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entered, making the comment, "I was only kidding anyway" (Transcript, page 37, 
line 13 through 15). 
The State's witnesses made it clear that there were other narcotics available as 
well as substantial amount of money which was required to be in the cash register of 
the business. There is no argument whatsoever that the Appellant made any attempt 
to take any of those items from the possession of the store owner or employee. 
These facts clearly indicate that the Appellant voluntarily terminated his 
criminal efforts prior to the commission of an aggravated robbery. Section 76-2-307 
(2) of the Utah Code Ann, concerns exactly such a scenario, "Voluntary termination 
of efforts prior to offense". Therein arises an affirmative defense to exactly such 
conduct as was attempted by the Appellant, Mr. Hendricks. 
With no requisite intent to commit the crime of aggravated robbery and a 
voluntary termination of his efforts prior to the commission of an aggravated robbery, 
Appellant is not suggesting that a crime did not take place, rather the Appellant 
argues that the uncontroverted facts suggest that Appellant is guilty of an aggravated 
assault rather than an aggravated robbery. 
Section 76-5-103 of the Utah Code Ann. Aggravated Assault reads as follows: 
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he commits assault as 
defined in Sec. 76-5-102 and he; 
(a) Intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another; or 
(b) Uses a dangerous weapon as defined in Sea 76-1-601 or 
other means or force likely to produce death or serious 
bodily injury. 
(2) Aggravated assault is a third-degree felony. 
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Finally, Appellant contends that the court failed to consider Section 76-3-402 
et al, of the Utah Code Ann. Conviction of lower degree of offense, 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant Lyle C. Hendricks petition for extraordinary relief was improperly 
dismissed in Second Judicial District Court. Due to unusual circumstances; newly 
discovered evidence of an affidavit by an officer of the court which casts doubt as to 
formulation of the requisite intent to commit the crime for which he was convicted. 
And a fundamental unfairness in that he was denied effective assistance 
of counsel, wherein his defense counsel failed to attempt suppression of prejudicial 
testimony, failed to cross-examine witnesses, failed to call witnesses for the defense, 
failed to address the jury, deliberately prejudiced his client by subjecting him to a 
voir dire in the presence of the jury, and failed to utilize an essential affirmative 
defense which, should have resulted in the Appellant's conviction on a lesser 
degree of offense. 
Wherefore, the Appellant appeals to this Honorable Court to reverse the 
decision of the Second Judicial District Court overruling Judge Glasmann's dismissal, 
remand the case for an evidentiary hearing, and any other relief this Court deems 
necessary. 
Dated _&ZL day of fA<*4 1993. 
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Respectfully Submitted, 
.yle/c. Hendricks Lyl< 
Attorney Pro Se 
Utah State Prison 
P.O. Box 250 
Draper, Utah 84020 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I have mailed four (4) true and correct copies of the above 
Appellant Brief to : Angela F. Micklos 
Assistant Attorney General 
330 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
postage pre-paid, this li*^ day of /<7H , 1993. 
'idjz.^Afc 
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ADDENDUM 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LYLE C. HENDRICKS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Defendant. 
\ 
\ 
\ 
RULING ON WRIT OF 
EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF 
Case No. 920900575 
Having examined the file in the above entitled case, I 
find that defendant's petition is repetitious of motions 
previously made and denied and I therefore am dismissing the 
petition on the ground that is frivolous. 
DATED this /2* day of January, 1993. 
MICHAEL J. SMANN, Judge 
Ruling 
Case No. 920900575 
Page Two 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the p day of January, 
1993, I sent a true and correct copy of the foregoing Ruling to 
counsel as follows: 
Lyle C. Hendricks 
P.O. Box 250 
Draper, UT 84020 
Reed M. Richards 
7th Floor Municipal Bldg. 
Ogden, UT 84401 
CQurfc c l ^ r ^ — ' 
iv,,/ \ . A * st? 
.-.. -, *~cr<.? r<vv yy#* 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
LYLE C. HENDRICKS, 
APPELLANT, 
- V -
STATE OF UTAH, 
APPELLEE, 
DOCKETING STATEMENT 
Case No: 930055-CA 
Jurisdiction 
This is an appeal from a final judgement entered in the Second District Court, 
for Weber County. This judgement denied appellant relief under Rule 65 U.R.CP. form 
his illegal confinement. Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal. 
Statement of the case 
Appellant filed with the district court under 65 (b) U.R.CP. based on newly 
discovered evidence. In appellant's trial a detective testified appellant confessed to 
him about the "reason" for the robbery. This detective testified that appellant's 
attorney was present during this confession. The prosecution used this so called 
confession to establish intent before the jury. Appellant now has affidavits to prove 
this attorney was never present and the confession never took place. 
1 
Statement of Facts 
Appellant was not properly represented at trial. There was never a confession. 
This evidence was used to establish intent. The jury found appellant guilty of first 
degree robbery. The new evidence viewed in light most favorable to the government 
should be allowed. This evidence proves perjury of one of the state's key witnesses. 
Issue on Appeal 
1. Newly discovered evidence. 
2. Ineffective assistance of counsel. 
3. Lesser included offence. 
4. Intent to commit robbery. 
Related Appeal 
This case was heard by this court on direct appeal a decision was entered on 
February 5, 1990. The evidence not available at the time. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
Lyle C. Hendricks 
2 
Certificate Of Service 
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the Docketing Statement to the 
following. This was done by placing it in the U.S. mail on the undersigned date. 
Jan Graham 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84104 
3 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
Lyle C. Hendricks, 
Petitioner and Appellant, 
v. 
State of Utah, 
Respondent and Appellee. 
FILED 
Utah Court of Appeals 
MAR 2 2 1993 
/ ' MaryT.Noonan 
* Clerk of the Court 
ORDER 
Case No, 930055-CA 
This matter is before the court upon appellee's motion to 
dismiss appeal, filed February 19, 1993. Appellant's objection 
to the motion was filed March 12, 1993. 
Appellee seeks dismissal of the appeal pursuant to Rule 
26(c) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure due to 
appellant's failure to timely file a docketing statement. On 
February 18, 1993, appellant filed his docketing statement. 
Now therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that appellee's motion 
to dismiss is denied. 
Dated thi^^^p^ay of March, 1993. 
BY T 
Regnal W. Garff, Judge 7/ 
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to December 8th of last year, were you working that afternoon^ 
A Yes. 
Q And was Mr. Murray working t h a t a f t e rnoon? 
A Yes . 
Q Mrs. Blackwell, did—would you please explain to 
the Jury what, if anything, happened at Murray's Pharmacy 
about 3:30 that afternoon? 
A Murray and I were in the pharmacy working. And a 
fellow came in with a gun and walked between us, and said 
he wanted all the class 2 narcotics. Murray told him we 
didn't have any, and to go see. And he said you show me. 
So Murray went over and opened the drawers and showed him 
we didn't have. And he turned and went out of the pharmacy 
and said I was just fooling anyway, or kidding, I don't 
remember for sure. And left the store. 
Q Mrs. Blackwell, when you said you and Murray 
were in the pharmacy, let me direct your attention over to 
this diagram, Proposed State's Exhibit number 4. Do you 
recognize this as a layout of the store, this being the 
Harrison entrance that's kitty-cornered, the shelves, some 
tables back here and a gate over here; a fair pharmacy sectioiji? 
A Yes. 
Q Is that what you were talking about when you said 
you and Murray were in the pharmacy area? 
A Yes. 
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couritoon today? 
A Yes. 
Q Would you please point him out? 
A Right there. 
Q The person in the striped shirt? 
A Yes, striped shirt. 
MS. KNOWLTON: May the record reflect the Defendant 
is wearing a striped shirt? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MS. KNOWLTON: Thank you. 
Q Mrs. Blackwell, is there any doubt in your mind 
this is the young man? 
A No. 
MS. KNOWLTON: I have no further questions. 
THE COURT: Mr. Laker? 
MR. LAKER: No questions. 
THE COURT: You may step down, thank you. May this 
witness be excused? 
MS. KNOWLTON: I have no objection. 
THE COURT: Mr. Laker? 
MR. LAKER: No objection. 
THE COURT: You are excused, thank you. 
MS. KNOWLTON: The State would call John Stallings. 
JOHN STALLINGS 
called as a witness, and having been first duly sworn, was 
44 
would^-say. He kind of got upset and wouldnft really talk 
to me, wouldnft really answer my questions. 
Q Okay. 
MS. KNOWLTON: I have no further questions. 
THE COURT: Mr. Laker? 
MR. LAKER: No questions of this witness 
^ -. THE COURT: You may step down, thank you. May 
this witness be excused? 
MS. KNOWLTON: Yesf your Honor, no cbjecuicn. 
MR. LAKER: No objection. 
THE COURT: You are excused. 
MS. KNOWLTON: The State would call Joe Chesser. 
JOSEPH L. CHESSER 
called as a witness, and haying been first duly sworn, 
was examined and testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MS. KNOWLTON: 
Q Would you please state your name and occupation? 
A Joseph L. Chesser. I am a police officer for 
Ogden City. 
Q And to what division are you specifically assigned? 
A To the Detective Division. 
87 
Q Was there more convorsn I;, ion? 
, THE COURT: I am not sure it is clear to me 
Bcisely who was in the room at the time this was taking 
ace. Let's go over that again. 
Q Okay, when you got back to the room, one of 
2 little interview rooms in the jail, who was there? 
A j n ^ 
dr^jc^T:? f r i ' g h t T f a f ' f e f . t h e ^ c b n v ' e r s a t i o I T ? s t a r t edV r jJg^T 
lrirC"7:Defellde^^ . - a r r a i g n m e n t s ^ 
- a t , . Svn'd'^theiY^ 
i n u t e-r-and^ s t a n d i t h e r e o f or :^a—coupier f of ^•minutes":''; Then 
walked back up t o t h e - - t o where t h e v i d e o a r r a i g n m e n t s 
e a t . fKi ld^then^heTfina 11 y*come-vba_ck a_nd sa id. t,.hai:"?if^ 
^ — - • . . — 
THE COURT: Was there any discussion as. to whether 
not this attorney was representing Mr. Hendricks or 
A ^IJaP'w^ 
icld me Mr. Stockdalc had resigned the case, fand^^li^t 
iader spirtergothex^vcoriver's'atipn . rA nj^^J 
.ding^n^^ 
Q You don't know the attorney's name?"-
A ' v:f•HinririkrTlf^was.-^G'ensen . I a s k e d M::; . Know 1 t on . 
TUF. COURT: What did ho look 1. i .k^ ? 
A Glasses, tall, kind of reddish blond short hair. 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
Q Detective Miner, what v/as next—who spoke next, 
you recall? 
A heT"Vtated "that'' he ''dlciri "t"' point/ the gun; at ••anybody . 
Q This is Mr. Hendricks talking? 
A Yes . 
Q Okay. What next, or who next spoke? 
A Me. 
Q What did you say? 
A I asked him why he went in tiie pharmacy. 
Q Did he have a response? 
A Yes. 
Q What did he say? 
A Ee^tolc^me?^ 
t^-'*he-rw"a'nte"d7s^  
^"to^teli^ rcbke"Ttha tr;r'day7::;rahd;' 
5-fCom±n.gTrdov^ 
t h T ^ a i ^ 
d i - v v > d u a l ^ - ^ rand r i he.? wan t e d 
*; s.tayphighT^^'Herrdidn^^^ 
—gQ^thrpjU'.gh'T-.witli'Jk'iXl 1 ng rftim*V 
0 What did you say? 
A I can't remember my response. I asked him more 
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THE COURT: Wore thoao nuido available to the 
defense? 
MR. LAKER: Yes. 
THE COURT: You had those reports? 
MR. LAKER: Yes. 
THE COURT: You were aware that that testimony 
would be at least attempted to be introduced today at 
trial? . . - - — __^ 
MR. LAKER: _ Yes-*—' 
THE COURT: The only reason for asking the question) 
is it seems likely it would have been logical to have 
a suppression hearing prior to trial if you v/ere concerned 
about the admissibilityf rather than right while it was 
going before the Jury. ^S 
\ 
-MR. LAKER: Well, I was—the police report is — 
the whole issue of whether there was counsel or not was 
very unclear. That part is not in there. 
THE COURT: The record indicates that Scott 
Jensen was counsel on the morning of the 9th, that he 
represented the Defendant at the arraignment. That they 
waived Preliminary Hearing, and it was bound over to 
District Court. 
MR. LAKER: Well, the problem I have with that, 
your Honor, is that it is—I am not sure it was clear 
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